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PREAMBLE:
This Reply Brief of the Appellant, Professor Rajani Kanth, is being submitted under the
auspices of Rule 24 (c )of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedures.
ARGUMENT
Appellee, in her Brief of Appellee, makes various Claims challenging the import of
some Primary Issues for Review (relating mainly to International and US Federal
Statutes) raised by the Appellant in his Appellant's Brief. These are addressed first, and
separately from miscellaneous other Ancillary Claims (relating mainly to Utah Statutes)
made by Appellee, that are duly considered in the succeeding section.
I. PRIMARY CLAIMS:
1. That the State Courts were under no obligation to Stay proceedings , involving
Custody Issues, during the pendency ofAppellant}s Federal Hague Convention
Appellate procedures, when requested both by Appellant (Sept.30/99; Jan. 14, 00;
May 2, 01) and by the US State Department on 11/03/2000 {at least the latter of
which - and the Text of the Document is appended to the original Appellant Brief
- might be presumed to know Hague Convention Law, since it is the official
executor of the Hague Convention in the US), because the Utah Federal Court
had dismissed Appellant's Hague Convention Application (on 12/14/99).
Rebuttal:
Aside from the absence of any Hague Convention based Legal Precept or Case
Law Evidence cited by the Appellee to substantiate this Claim, the Claim itself is ,
on general legal grounds alone, trivially false. The relevant Hague Convention
1

Provision - Article 16 - which is unambiguous, is here reproduced as follows:
After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article
3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has
been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of
custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this
Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a
reasonable time following receipt of the notice.
[Similar also is the injunction to be found in the Hague Convention's Enabling
Legislation in the United States , the ICARA, which states, in Section 2 (b) (4)]:
The Convention and this Act empower courts in the United States to determine only
rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying custody claims
Both the Tenth Circuit and the US Supreme Court could have, potentially, ruled
in favor of the Appellant and Ordered a Return of the Kanth children: as such, the
Hague Convention Process and Protocols were very much alive and far from
exhausted, with the Issue of the Return of the Children far from having been
finally 'determined'* when the Trial Court ,acting in premature and arguably
legally improper haste to confer a child abductor with custodial legitimacy, took
up review of such matters. The Tenth Circuit Denial of the Appellant's Federal
Appeal (delivered in November 2000) was not yet in when Court gave Appellee
temporary, but sole custody, in January of 2000; and, on June 18th, 2001, when
the State Court, ignoring Appellant's Filed Plea for a Stay pending resolution of
the Petition, went on to award final sole custody to the Appellee, in the face of
the principled abstention of the Appellant, it was yet again acting in disregard of
the operation of the Convention, given that the Appellant's Certiorari Petition
(denied by the USSC on June 25, 01) was still pending with the US Supreme
2

Court.
In support of this contention of Appellant is the fact that the US State
Department, the Central Authority overseeing Treaty enforcement in the US,
went to the extent of directly writing both to Judge Stirba and Commissioner
Evans citing chapter and verse as to why they should not, under Federal Laws, be
proceeding in that fashion and at that time (the Letter, dated 11/3/2000 is
appended to the original Appellant Brief).
The lack of effective judicial knowledge of the Hague Convention Protocols - the
Convention itself is relatively new and the Cases tried under it, especially in the
Western States, barring California, are very few - and the ICARA (the enabling
Federal Legislation in the US) , is the probable cause of this default both of the
Tenth Circuit and the Utah Trial Court in this respect. Indeed , to circumvent this
rather obvious fact, the State Department mails out a Brochure, specially
designedfor the benefit ofJudges, which was sent both to the Tenth Circuit and
the Utah Trial Court but obviously to no avail..
Appellant has researched and written a Brief - submitted to the US Supreme
Court as his Petition for Certiorari - on the subject of the Federal Judge's
serious misconstrual of the Convention notion of Habitual Residence which she
mistook to mean "permanent residence", in explicit contradiction of Convention
norms. Any reasonable read of that document should clarify the extent to which
the Utah Federal Court has, in its errant definition of habitual residence,
3

mistakenly set an ominous precedent explicitly opposed to the intent of the
Convention, viz., to deter international child abduction undertaken with a view to
'forum shopping \ Furthermore, in disallowing the obvious fact of the habitual
residence of the Kanths in Australia, the Utah Federal Court focused not on the
children's situation, as required a but only on the Appellant's' putative ' intent',
as specifically proscribed. Indeed, this reference on p. 6 of the Utah Federal
Court Judgment, para#026, leaves no room for doubt on this matter:
as far as An] ana could be seen as settled in Australia ...the focus must be dictated by the
yersyective of her parents (emphasis supplied by the Petitioner).

The Circuit Court echoed this very error when it boldly states, in para#3, p.2 of its
Judgment, that:
the conduct intentions and agreements of the parents during the time preceding the
abduction are important factors to be considered (emphasis supplied by Petitioner).

Au contraire, the Canonical US 6l Circuit judgment, that is the legal benchmark
standard on this issue has it, in line with Convention norms, exactly otherwise:
Habitual residence: "To determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the
child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions." Friedrich v.
Friedrich. 983 F2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
And, further, even more strikingly:
Any future plans that Mr. Friedrich had for Thomas...are irrelevant to our
inquiry...habitual residence can be altered only by a change in geography and the
passage of time, not by changes in parental affection and responsibility (emphasis
supplied by Petitioner)

Indeed, Appellee boldly cites a Letter written by Appellant 5 in her Appellee's
Brief, in this very context , that only indicates precisely what is irrelevant, viz..,
Appellant's future intentions': so much , again, for getting the Hague Convention
notion categorically wrong.
4

Finally, setting the ultimate seal on the arbitrary nature of the entire Federal
proceedings, and the prejudice conferred on this Appellant, the Utah Federal
Judge disallowed the very Hague Convention Petitioner's Brief of this Pro Se
Complainant (it was also a Hague Case decided against a Petitioner without grant
of a single Hearing across the entire proceedings) - a dubious 'First5 in Hague
Convention Litigation - for being, allegedly, a day late in reaching Court.
Exactly what the Judge 'adjudicated' in the absence of the Petitioner's Ha2ue
Petition, will remain a permanent mystery
2. That, with the Closure of Hague Convention Proceedings ( effectual only in
August of 2001) the critical jurisdictional issue is now 'settled', such that the
Utah Court can now ( as it indeed has) assume jurisdiction.
Rebuttal:
As the US Federal ICARA makes clear, under Section (4) h:
(h) REMEDIES UNDER THE CONVENTION NOT EXCLUSIVE.-The remedies
established by the Convention and this Act shall be in addition
to remedies available under other laws or international
agreements.

Appellant's Australian Family Court Filing (June 3, 99), still pending, predating
as it does Appellee's Filings in Utah (July 2, 99) preempts these Utah proceedings
under applicable UCCJA and UCCJEA Guidelines (Appellant is Pro Se in the
matter there, whereas Appellee has engaged a Sydney law firm). As such, the issue
of proper subject matter jurisdiction (to say nothing of in personam jurisdiction,
given that Appellant has been a foreign resident since 1996) is either actually, or
5

potentially, still subjudice , and not at all a closed chapter.
3. That the Appellant had 'misconstrued' the Hague Convention Doctrine of
' Acquiescence' in believing it pre-empted his participation in State Court
Proceedings without jeopardy to his case.
Rebuttal:
Appellee offers neither Legal nor Evidentiary Hague Convention Case Law facts
to substantiate this erroneous Claim. The Hague Convention Article [13 (a)] at
issue is here reproduced:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative
authority of the requested State is not bound to orders the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that—
(a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not
actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.
As for Hague Convention Case Law support, in line with the Appellant's
argument, suffice to note that, in 1996, the UK Court of Appeals 5 in Hvs. H
[1996 2 FLR 570 at 574] held that an Israeli father's decision to resolve
matrimonial differences through recourse to local religious courts in Israel
effectively constituted 'acquiescence', thereby rejecting his Hague Convention
Petition on that basis alone.
The Eliza Perez Vera Report, the Authoritative Document of the Convention states
the more general principle categorically, in paragraph 115:
On the other hand, the guardian's conduct can also alter
the characterization of the abductor's action, in cases where he
has agreed to, or thereafter acquiesced in, the removal which he
now seeks to challenge.

The rationale of Appellant's non-participation in post-abduction Court proceedings
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in the 'asylum' country is patently obvious: the Convention is about Returning
Abducted Children to the Jurisdiction from which they have been stolen - it stands to
reason that it is insensible to be accepting - i.e.,' acquiescing' to - Utah jurisdiction
whilst in the thick of a Hague Case challenging precisely the Children's Wrongful
Removal to Utah. Any substantive participation by the Appellant in Utah proceedings
would have trivially jeopardized his Case under the rubric of the passage quoted
above, as in the dispositive Case ofHvincited

above.

The ultimate irony of this Claim by the Appellee is that she herself raised this
'Acquiescence' charge, under Article 13 (a), against the Appellant in Federal Courts,
albeit on other grounds, and would have raised it again, on the very grounds now
being challenged, had Appellant participated. So much for good faith.
4. Appellee further claims that the UCCJA protocols were not violated by the State
Courts, as charged by the Appellant; and that the UCCJEA was not effective until
July of 2000.
Rebuttal:
With respect to the violation of applicable UCCJA protocols, Appellant will not
cite the operative Clauses again (all previously cited in the Appellant Brief). It is
an undeniable fact that Appellee surreptitiously, and cruelly, abducted the Kanth
minor children across international borders in defiance of the law, decency, and
reason: no Court, Federal nor State, has denied that fact, nor indeed could they.
All that the Federal Court, arguably erroneously in the opinion of the Appellant,

[Appellate Courts exist only because Courts make mistakes , especially when it is
in an area of International Law of recent origin, honored thus far usually in the
breach by most Signatory Countries, which is not the usual fare of the Tenth
Circuit: indeed, the Federal judge who ruled against the Appellant had never
before tried a Hague Case, and her ruling rebels radically against the grain of
both Hague Convention Authority and the Canonical mainstream US Circuit Court
Opinions, thwarting effectively , by ill-considered precedent, the intent of the
Convention .Furthermore, and importantly, the US Supreme Court never ruled
against the Appellant on Merits: it simply did not accept consideration of the
Appeal, given its own priorities ] ruled on is where the dispute, and any
culpability in the matter, could be legally resolved.
The debate, in effect, was over Jurisdiction, not over the fact of the abduction. It is
an ancillary, but nonetheless high, irony that the Utah Federal Court turned a
Hague Convention Jurisdiction Case, in its rendering, against the explicit logos of
the Convention, into a sort of a 'best interest of the child1 Case - hardly fit
subject matter for a Federal Court to be deciding. Appellee correctly points out
that Appellant had to struggle, Pro Se, to 'win back5 his Hague Case from the
same Judge, but carefully omits to mention that he won it on the argument that
Federal Courts have no jurisdictional right to 'settle' divorce and custody issues,
in context of a Hague Case, as had transpired in the absence of the Appellant.
At any rate, given the fact of the abduction, the UCCJA * Clean Hands' Doctrine,
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proscribing assumption of jurisdiction under such coercive circumstances, as cited
in the Appellant Brief, applies in full force: no Court, under the Statute cited, in
the US , should be granting jurisdiction to a child abducting parent (whether the
abduction is overseas or within the US is not relevant: indeed the Australian
Government had already certified, under the Australian Family Law Act 1975 [As
Amended] Sections 61 B & C, to the Wrongful Removal of the Kanth Children:
the Document, authored by their Governmental Solicitor, Ms. Doreen Muirhead,
is attached to the Appellant Brief). That much again, is both given by applicable
Law, and by the ordinary canons of civil decency and juridical ethics.
Furthermore, there was/is a Prior, (and still pending) Australian Custody Case
filed by the Appellant: yet again the UCCJA is unambiguous in asking for full
deference, and all due effort at proper communication, to be shown to the Foreign
Court given such a Priority in Filing. The Trial Court did neither, even when
reminded.
Finally, it is a purely self-evident factual matter that the Kanth family were
'ordinarily resident' in Australia, between June 1997 until the abduction (3/25/99):
the very fact that Appellee had to mark time for 3 months subsequent to her
abduction before filing for custody in Utah is indefeasible proof of that. She had
effectively 'lost'Utah residency, and that loss had to be matched by a 'gain'
someplace else. Appellee was not floating in ether between 1997 and 1999: she ,
as indeed the entire family, ordinarily resided - and that is the substantive
9

meaning of 'habitual residence' misconstrued, in manifest error, by the Federal
Court as implying 'permanent residence' - in Sydney, Australia.
As for the UCCJEA not yet 'being in force', the Trial' awarding final and sole
custody to an unstable child abductor, in the legally constrained absence of the
Appellant, was held on June 18, 2001: clearly , the UCCJEA was in full force by
then and could, and should, have been referred to (and deferred to), especially
since Appellant's Motion to Stay (05/02/01), heard on June 4th, 2001 by the Utah
State Court, explicitly relied on parts of the UCCJEA. At any rate,
notwithstanding all that, the UCC JA itself is explicit enough on the matters above,
as previously cited in the Appellant Brief; so it did not require any further
reaffirmation by recourse to the UCCJEA as well.
5. Appellee, quite ingeniously, claims that the Utah State Court could legitimately
take advantage of an entirely putative jurisdictional vacuumf in order to take up
custody matters whilst the Hague Convention Case was pending. Inter alia, the
suggestion is that 'temporary orders' do not contravene Statutory prohibitions.
Rebuttal:
Appellant's Hague Convention Papers were filed in Sydney in May 14th of 1999, just
as his Australian Custody Case was filed in June 3rd of 1999. Once Filed, the
Convention exerts all due legal force with legal responsibilities vesting both in the
State where the abduction was carried out and in the 'asylum' State where the
abductees were taken: to claim, against such incontrovertible facts, that there was
10

some hypothetical 'jurisdictional vacuum' is simply absurd. The Hague Convention
(via the enabling US Federal legislation of the ICARA ) was in full force; the
Australian Custody Case Filings had been served on the Appellee in Utah, on the 9th
of June, 1999, long before she filed with the State Court in Utah, and the applicable ,
and governing, UCCJA guidelines pre-existed in the Statute Books.
The only identifiable 'vacuum ', if any existed, was in the proper heeding of these
various legal instruments , and the direction they pointed to, by the Utah Trial Court
which acted in disregard of these Statutes. Whilst ignorance of the Hague Convention
is certainly understandable, for being quite universal - it is hardly the staple fare of
the Third District Court - the lack of deference to the Federal UCCJA and the
Australian Filings is far less comprehensible..
The 'temporary custody orders' not only violated applicable Statutes (they were
issued also without an Evidentiary Hearing) but conferred Prejudice on this Appellant
since they were the basis for contingent, and wholly repugnant, visitational limitations
- in effect an abridgment of Appellant's and his childrens' Constitutional liberties placed upon a blameless parent.
II. ANCILLARY CLAIMS
1. Appellee claims that Court did not err in not conducting an investigation
when Appellant repeatedly brought the fact of ongoing physical and/or
emotional abuse of the abductees ( a matter that is far from ended), within the
Appellee's household, to the attention of both the Guardian Ad Litem [who ,
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despite her title, acted more like Counsel for Appellee in this matter, showing
scant regard for the welfare of the children, even after some of the more
infelicitous behavioral propensities of the Appellee, and her kin, were directly
made known to her; even if no other evidence existed, it is now established legal
opinion, in the US and abroad , that child abduction itself is a form of child abuse
- see the pathbreaking Report by Dr. Dorothy Huntington cited in the Table of
Authorities - and as such prima facie evidence already existed to warrant an
examination of the impact on the children of that heinous act and a professional
evaluation of their household situation] and Court directly , claiming that such an
investigation , under 30-3-5.2 UCA , is 'discretionary'.
Possibly, it is so - in which case there was an abuse of discretion, though the
specific Statute cited by Appellant in his Appellant Brief seemed quite
unmistakably categorical in this regard. Indeed, the thought occurred to this
Appellant, several times during the proceedings, that the Trial Court appeared
often to regard simple deference to principles embodied even in the US
Constitution - in particular its guaranteed liberties - as a 'discretionary5 matter.
2. Appellee hints darkly that there was some ominous Evidentiary basis for the
improper issuance of a TRO (June 14, 00) to break up an on-going peaceful
legitimate visitation in a Salt Lake Hotel by force. It is imperative to note that at
the time the TRO was issued, the Appellant had no legal restrictions on visitation
time so Appellee's suggestion that the children were being 'held over' (during
12

their school intersession) has no legal meaning whatsoever. In point of fact,
Appellee - who had free access to the children at all times - had been fully
informed that the children would spend but 5 nights with Appellant and so, with
full knowledge of the real situation, deliberately and disingenuously invoked the
TRO.
Typically, there is no credible evidence proffered of any 'foul intent' on part of
Appellant, nor could there have been, other than misrepresentations-cummisapprehensions on the part of Appellee. In effect, there were no valid rationale,
legal or empirical, except the possible paranoid delusion of an unstable abductor
(which cannot be entirely ruled out) fearful that this Appellant, a responsible
academic with affiliations held of the stature of Oxford and Harvard, would stoop
to her level of reprehensible behavior and abduct the children himself. The foul
intent, if any existed at all, was more likely on the part of Appellee, ill-advisedly
attempting to tarnish Appellant with her manner of brush so as to paint him black.
The simple refutation of the suggestion, baseless as it is, that the Appellant might
be planning an abduction of the children - a charge lightly tossed around in
Appellee's Brief to convey that as a sort of an underlying motif - and the likely
concocted 'fear' of the Appellee in this regard , is the fact that just a week or so
prior to this wholly illegal break up of a lawful visitation, Appellee had traveled
with Appellant spending four nights with him and the children in the same hotel
room in Disneyland without any qualms. Clearly , the California locale might
13

have been far more conducive to a plotted abduction gamble, like that being
insinuated - given the myriad opportunities in the crowds of Disneyland,
unescorted as the familial ensemble was by the Canadian Mounties, and outside
of Utah jurisdiction to boot, to effect such a foolhardy escapade.
Indeed, the real reason for the illegal break up by means of a TRO was possibly
due to a more subtle matter: the abductor's chagrin at the affectionate and joyful
rebonding between father and abductees (in the 4 days that they spent with their
father, neither child even once remembered their abducting mother in the
whirlwind of eating out and romping in the park:; indeed, it was the Appellant
who asked them to call Appellee at least once every evening during that time),
after the deliberate effort, a family-wide enterprise in Appellee's household, to
permanently estrange them from him, in the post abduction brainwashing, by
means of coarse recourse to real and fictitious differences in national origin,
religious belief, modes of speech and even culinary preferences.
To this day, Appellant's younger daughter, too young to remember her father
(except via the misinformation supplied by the abductors' household) given her
abduction at but a tender 2 years of age , and the forcible separation from
Appellant since, has been virulently brainwashed to believe that she is
'american' whilst her father is ' Indian" (or that she is 'mormon' whereas the
Appellant, a secular humanist, is 'hindu') bearing the unmistakable , if tainted,
fingerprint of the ignorant and contemptible intent that resides , along with the
14

children, in their abductor's home.
Regardful of Appellee's fragile, anxiety-ridden, mental state (and she can hardly
be faulted for her more chronic disabilities: the Great Deception of the Child
Abduction was quite predictably followed through with a tangled web of back-up
dissemblings) it is her Counsel (under whose tutoring Appellee has submissively
litigated these matters trustingly close to 3 years now, refusing any and all modus
vivendi dialogue with Appellant; as referred to in the Appellant Brief, Appellee's
normal condition is one of easily succumbing , given her syndrome of chronic
fear and anxiety, to imaginary threats to her wellbeing) whose approach to Court
would have enabled the issuance of such an Order (signed by Judge Sandra
Peuler who was not the officiating judge in the case, and presumably unaware of
the facts of the Case enough to be so misled), freely trampling on the
Constitutional liberty rights of both Appellant and his children.
Given Appellee's pardonable ignorance in such matters, Appellant holds Counsel
Green responsible in this instance for wanton misuse of a legitimate legal
instrument for purpose nefarious. Indeed, Appellant was compelled to file Two
separate Complaints against Counsel with the Utah State Bar, and another with
the Tenth Circuit (which, quite predictably, got nowhere) for various other
species of unethical conduct, unbecoming of the dignity of an Officer of the
Court, which helps secure this prima facie conviction , if not conclusive proof,
of his key role, in this instance, in the mind of the Appellant.
15

3. Appellee also casts doubt on the 'conflict of interest' matter with Commissioner
Arnett trying even to impute bad faith to the Appellant in waiting as long as he did
to raise the issue. Yet again, the facts gainsay the gratuitous speculation: Lisa
Jones had appeared specially in front of Mr. Arnett for Appellant without the
latter being aware of the presiding magistrate's identity (the Appellant resides in
Singapore not privy to daily bulletins); when Ms. Jones reported back to the
Appellant, by Email, after the Hearing, Appellant disclosed his Arnett connection
to her which embarrassed her considerably : indeed she - understandably refused to then ask Arnett to recuse himself, at which point Appellant directly
wrote to the Judge (2/1/00; 2/16/00) and the Commissioner (3/25/00), who then
recused himself (6/12/00) after Judge Stirba brought it to his attention ( so it was
a species of 'voluntary' recusal - but after the fact of the complaint).
But the key point is not this clarifying background, but that whilst Commissioner
Arnett was recused , his ruling against the Appellant still remained on the books :
which is pure Alice in Wonderland (judge recused, but judgment stands). A
conflict of interest situation is not resolved by the magistrate stepping down, after
the fact of a potentially biased delivery of judgment which is then allowed to
remain on the books.
4. Appellee consistently, and frequently, makes the specious argument that
Appellant did not challenge any of the 'findings' of Court, nor offer any
alternative evidentiary materials, nor participate, whilst matters were still sub
16

judice, implying that he had thereby surrendered his Right to Object; but that is
putting the factual cart before the legal horse. It is indeed one of the central issues
of this Appeal that the Appellee , in unseemly fashion, capitalized on the
justifiable , Convention-based legal inability of Appellant to participate
substantively , virtually dictating her own unilateral draft of a draconian Decree
of Divorce, with a compliant Court obliging her uncritically.
Indeed, from a purely rationalist perspective, there can be no other 'motivation',
no 'hidden agenda' for Appellant's non-participation that would make any sense
whatsoever, given the grievous losses he sustained in the process, were it not for
his restraining legal disability preventing full participation. If this were not the
case, it would be insensible on his part to so often hire expensive lawyers to make
special appearances on his behalf when far more could be gained by having them
involved substantively. In effect, Appellee has no evidentiary basis - if nonparticipation by Appellant was a ploy, what then was the intent? - that could serve
as a reasonable critique of Appellant's principled abstention.
5. Appellee, rushing to a tendentious defense of Court, argues that UCA Statute 303-11.1 has never been implemented or enforced. Appellant is no legal expert, but
clearly empirical non-conformity, i.e. no prior record of enforcement, with a
Statute is hardly sufficient grounds to gainsay the legality of the statute itself, nor
condoning violations of it, nor even an argument against invoking its use.
6. Appellee scoffs at Appellant's Complaint that Hearings were some times called ,
17

at Appellee's instigation, granting no time for Appellant to find Counsel, whilst
simultaneously disallowing telephonic participation from abroad , thereby
engineering a very predictable 'default' citation of the Appellant.
The facts - stubborn things as they are - gainsay the gratuitous scoffing: Appellant
resides in Singapore, not Bountiful; and Court needs to fully fathom the meaning
of that simple fact and its bearing on Appellant's entire modus of participation in
Utah Court proceedings. It is this that accounts for his frequent 'on-and-off
recourse to Counsels, when he could not physically be in Utah to represent himself
(as such, Appellee, quite literally, had a 'Home Court Advantage'). Indeed this
entire Case, conducted in Utah, was precipitated by the Appellee decamping from
her Australian home with Appellant's children, in a carefully orchestrated and
violent abduction (the terrified little girls, crying and protesting, were forcibly
yanked out of their classroom, thrown in a cab, and rushed to the airport, for a
nightmare ride to Utah having been told their father was about to murder them)
whilst he was still employed and resident there, thereby causing unimaginable
hardship ever since in a purely logistical sense apart from other species of
trauma. He was operating Pro Se (in this and in Federal Courts) at the time the
specific Hearing in question was called at the clever instigation of Counsel who
waited until Appellant had indicated his departure date to Singapore to
Appellee, so as to request a Hearing well after that date , another astute stratagem
drawn from his apparently seamless bag of tricks
18

Appellant tried but could not find a qualified (and affordable) attorney who knew
both Utah Family Law and the Hague Convention (even when in possession of
local attorneys, Appellant had to frequently draft his own Briefs owing to lack of
information on the part of Counsels), ready willing, and able, to take it on (it was
Xmas break, and no one even returned his calls at the time). Indeed, Mr. Russell
Hettinger, a Salt Lake attorney who eventually came on board, made a specific
representation to Court validating his inability to appear for Appellant when
contacted for that purpose thereby confirming this account quite fully.The ensuing
and eminently reasonable request, from Appellant, therefore, to be allowed to
participate by telephone from Singapore was then, inappropriately, turned down
by Commissioner Evans (though communicated to Appellant by his legal secretary
over the phone, when contacted by Appellant).
In effect, as mentioned by Appellant in his Appellant Brief, Court, in this and
other instances , showed an unmistakable animus toward the Appellant,
displaying scant regard for the constraints of his overseas location, thereby
virtually guaranteeing that his interest would suffer some, or other, form of
prejudice.
7. Appellee further cites the fact that Appellant was forced to obtain a TRO to stop
the sub rosa baptism of his daughter: this issue has no relevance to the Appeal,
but is cited by Appellee (just possibly to insinuate that Appellant bears some
unspecified hostility to the dominant faith in Utah : he does not) to affirm the
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canard that Appellant 'stipulated' (he did not, so that much is a flat out
misrepresentation) to the baptism of his abducted child (which would have thereby
betokened , on the part of the Appellant, an acceptance of jurisdiction).
The facts, which further illumine the conduct of the Appellee after the abduction,
are as follows:the baptism of Malini was surreptitiously hoped to be carried out
by the Appellee without Appellant's knowledge and devoid of his presence, as
part of the strategy of driving a freshly minted cultural wedge to further widen
the physical distance (to this day, Appellee has prevented Malini from sharing
her Email address with the Appellant; letters to her, on occasion, are not
delivered or 'lost'; and special activities are thoughtfully set up for both children
at the only reasonable time Appellant is able to call them from overseas) between
father and children created by the abduction. Indeed, the effort to shut out the
Appellant went as far as to get a primary teacher of the Butler Ward, to actually
scribe a letter to Court stating that the Mormon faith did not require a father's
consent and/or blessing for baptism, a position that was to be categorically
rejected by both the Bishop and the President of the Ward when directly
approached by the Appellant.
No member of the Appellee's immediate family had ever entered church in their
entire adult lives, and yet most likely with a view to curry favor with the Church,
enlist the support of the congregation, and leech off its generous welfare
provisions, both Appellee and her mother began to patronize the local Ward
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immediately, and suddenly, after the abduction, in a born-again fashion.
At aii) rate, obtaining a TRO, only as a temporary expedient, Appellant the
traveled to Utah, as soon as his employ permitted, to ascertain his daughter's
intent, and confirming its genuineness, freely gave his blessing and stood by her,
to the open chagrin of the abductor and her family, as she was baptized. Indeed,
since then Appellant has been attending Church services, to learn more about his
daughter's new faith, even in Singapore. Nonetheless, he did not 'stipulate'
despite the paperwork drawn up by Counsel: indeed, the reams of paperwork
adduced in this Case - necessary, gratuitous , and replicative, in rising order of
\ i)!iiiile by Counsel for Appellee has to be seen to be believed..
8. Appellee argues that, upon one or other occasion, Appellant appeared, through
Counsel, 'generally5, in February, 2001; but this was simply a memory lapse on
the part of fresh counsel who had been instructed otherwise. Nonetheless, at the
time of announcing his initial involvement in the Case, Counsel had indicated, for
the record, that it would be by way of special appearances only.
CONCLUSION:
Given the foregoing, it is now possible to sum up the Issues confronted in this
Brief: Appellant, in and through the refutations provided above, reaffirms the
following contentions already extant in his original Appellant Brief:
That the Trial Court erred in refusing to Stay proceedings whilst the Convention
was still in operation , even when the US State Department, Executor of the
21

Convention in the US, specifically urged Court to do so, thereby setting the stage
for a Default on the part of a legally disabled Appellant who suffered extreme
prejudice to his interest in consequence.
That, under the UCCJA 'Clean Hands' doctrine, in addition to the Hague
Convention/ICARA guidelines, Court should not have granted Jurisdiction, let
alone final custody, to the Appellee given the fact of child abduction.
That, further, under both the UCCJA and the UCCJEA (the Hague Convention is
not an exclusive or exclusionary recourse to a Complainant in International Child
Abduction Cases) the prior Filing in Sydney for Custody by the Appellant should
have been (and needs still be) deferred to, and so Court erred again in its twin
failures: refusing to desist from proceeding with the Case , and refraining from
communicating with the Australian Court.
That the Trial Court erred in not acting, as per Statute, to take specified steps to
protect the children when notified of on-going mistreatment and/or abuse.
That Court was similarly flouting propriety when it let stand Commissioner
Arnett's ruling against the Appellant, despite his recusal: prejudice to the
Appellant arose from the fact that the Commissioner's grant of 'temporary
custody' to a child abductor, without an evidentiary hearing, was the original basis
for setting up a slew of radical limitations effectively curtailing Appellant's
visitation rights already virtually non-existent given his overseas employ and
residence.
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That Court was , in an aggravated key, also violating the guaranteed
Constitutional liberties of Appellant and his minor childi en whilst entering into its
Final, Ex Parte Divorce Decree gratuitously cruel, unusual, punitive, and even
Byzantine, restrictions on normal visitation - something that has not taken place
since June of 2000 - between a natural, and blameless, father ami his children,
punishing both, whilst simultaneously rewarding, in all Orwellian irony, a
psychologically unstable and proclaimed wrong-doer - a child abductor is a
child abductor is a child abductor - and exploiter of hapless minor children,
with financial gains and custodial benedictions..
Finally, it is Appellant's firm conviction that the miscellaneous disabilities
imposed upon him in this process indicate a distinct pattern of a real, if latent,
animus borne against him by various judicial functionaries of Court who misused
and/or abused legal discretion in the direction of thwarting his legitimate claim to
justice - in effect, a wrong-doer was rewarded whilst the victim was punished thereby showing scant regard for the precept that is the crown jewel of the
American Constitution.
Appellant has learnt, the hardest way possible - total and unconscionable loss of
contact with his own abducted children judicially separatedfrom him for three
years without any legal or evidentiary basis - just how far all the majestic
trappings of a purely formal legality can deviate, from even the semblance of the
most elementary norms of ethics, fairness, decency, and justice.
23

Not only did the Trial Court act arguably in disregard of the Law, it acted, more
often than not, also unethically: and, once devoid of ethics, legality only profanes
the name of justice. Judging by what actually transpired, it is sad but true that the
Appellant would have been far better off in all regards had he , and not the
Appellee, been the child abductor. No more compelling indictment of the modus
operandi of the Trial Court is necessary than that simple fact: a Family Court, ipso
facto, needs to exercise far more wisdom, humanity, and circumspection than was
actually shown.
A family has been rudely torn apart here by the vicious action - an act no less of
domestic terrorism - of a radically unstable mother (though grievously misled , in
this direction, given her own disabilities, by her unscrupulous domestic and legal
advisors) seeking purely pecuniary advantages: even if Court harbored no empathy
for the integrity of this family, or the welfare of the minor children, it may still
wish to recognize that a father's rights - to say nothing ofchildrens' rights in
relation to their father - are not to be unilaterally bartered away on adversarialist,
legalistic, formalistic, or any other such eristic grounds.
Every decree in the Trial Court's judgment was, in its nature, an Ex Parte order,
based on one-sided 'evidence', given the constrained non-participation of the
Appellant. Appellant did not disrespectfully not appear, nor engage in some other
such egregious form of default, but spent a small fortune he did not possess
wherever and whenever possible, to secure Counsel to appear in Court and keep
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the Trial Court, which quite wholly disregarded his logistical and legal plight,
folly advised of his openly articulated legal dilemma(s)..
As such, Appellant respectfully requests Court to strike down the divorce decree
injoto, given its shaky legal, evidentiary, ethical, andjurisdictional feases (this
was, from start to finish, a mistrial) and return matters to the status quo ante , so
Appellant can then review and pursue all his legal and personal options , and
Appellee, likewise, can reconsider her own aberrant actions. The minor children,
the pathetic victims of 3 years of relentless legal chicanery on the part of their
abductor deserve no less.
Dated: April 3 - P , 2002
Singapore
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Respondent and Appellant, Pro Se
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